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Are state governments in Europe losing elections with increasing frequency in the last few years? Is this 
an effect of the financial and economic crisis that began to burst by the mid-2000s? Does this imply a 
significant change in the voters’ evaluation of governments’ performance in comparison with past periods 
of higher economic and political stability? How are the different political parties suffering the effects of 
these changes?  
We analyze these issues in the following pages according to this plan. First, we give an overview 
to the electoral upheaval that has crossed almost all Europe in the last few years and to some insights in 
previous studies on the subject. Then, we discuss the validity of both the “prospective” voting and the 
“retrospective” voting theories to deal with voters’ motivations at the time of voting. Relevant questions 
to be discussed in the following sections include the characterization of the performance of the economy 
as a valence issue; the consequences of the transnationalization of economic relations, particularly within 
the European Union, for evaluating government’s responsibility in domestic economic performance; and 
the institutional and party system differences between countries that can make that responsibility more or 
less easier to identify.  
On the basis of this discussion, the last part of the paper presents a number of operationalized 
variables to estimate changes in economic performance, political party and government ideology, 
candidates’ incumbency, and government parties’ gains and losses of votes in successive elections. By 
statistical regression analysis we submit our hypotheses and conjectures to empirical tests.  
We postulate that the voters’ electoral behavior in many European countries during the last few 
years can be compared to the usual reaction to “firing the coach” in sports when a team underperforms 
regarding previous achievements and usual expectations. Although voters can be aware that governments 
are not fully responsible for a bad performance of the economy, as this has a transnational scope and 
depends on many other private and public actors, they take the option of making governments responsive 
because the existing institutional setting does not facilitate better targeted decisions. 
A major implication of the results of the following analysis refers to the feasibility of making 
governments accountable for their real actions under the current conditions in most European countries 
and the European Union. As accountability is an essential element of representative democracy, the 
conclusions of this study may permit foremost normative inferences and intriguing wonders about the 
future of democracy at both the state and the Union levels. 
 
 
1. Incumbency Disadvantages 
 
A high number of state-wide elections in European countries during the last few years have produced 
unprecedented results, especially regarding the defeat of parties in government. Just to mention a few 
outstanding cases, in Iceland in 2009 the incumbent Independence Party, which had been in power for 
eighteen years, lost a third of its support and went into opposition; in the United Kingdom in 2010 the 
incumbent Labour party obtained its worst result in proportion of votes since WWI, when it became a 
government party for the first time; in Hungary in 2010 the Social-democrats in government lost more 
than half of their previous electoral support; in Ireland in 2011 the Fiana Fail, the most common ruling 
party since the country’s independence, slipped to third in votes; in Spain in 2011 the incumbent 
Socialists got their worst result since the reestablishment of democracy in 1977.  
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 This kind of upheaval is not completely new. All across the 19
th
 and the 20
th
 centuries new 
financial crises were associated with high rates of prime ministers’ turnover in democratic countries, with 
a peak during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Jeffrey Chwieroth and Andrew Walter note, however, 
that since the 1970s incumbent governments have been punished severely for crises and recessions that 
were often milder than in the troubled interwar period. They argue that this can be due to the 
disappointment of greater expectations regarding the benefits of economic governmental management 
that became entrenched in the post-WWII period (Chwieroth and Walter, 2010).  
Specifically, the crisis of the 1990s and the parallel increase in European integration concurred 
with the end of long periods of single party dominances, such as for the Social-democrats in Sweden and 
the Christian-democrats in Italy. Further transnationalization of the economy seems to be decreasing both 
the capability of state governments to face crises and the subsequent voters’ support to their rulers. 
 We focus on Europe because it’s where both the depth of the economic crisis and the extension 
and duration of political turmoil are greater than in other regions of the world. It could have been 
expected that a crisis with such an international scope would have also pushed a number of dictatorial 
regimes out, especially in underdeveloped countries. But so far the economic consequences of decreases 
in foreign investment and trade in those countries have been less severe and a number of incumbent rulers 
have been able to portray themselves as innocent victims of the economic problems of the developed 
world. Whether the series of revolts and regime changes in the so-called “Arab Spring” can be closely 
associated to new economic troubles is to be explored. In Europe, nevertheless, there is the sense that the 
observed political instability during the last few years may be just the beginning of more grandiose 
transformations. (Pepinsky, 2012). 
 That a sudden, deep recession would hurt electorally the parties in government was not obvious at 
first sight. Actually there were a few early analyses conjecturing that the international scope of the crisis 
might trigger a turn in favor of incumbent governments as a consequence of both a sense of government’s 
impotence and a reaction to seek refuge into the hands of sitting rulers in times of emergency. This would 
have been a similar reaction to the one it can be often observed with natural disasters, terrorist attacks or 
external aggressions. It was, thus, conjectured that citizens would condone bad economic performance of 
governments that could be deemed not to be fully responsible for domestic economic outcomes. One 
study found, for instance, that for the period 1975-2002 “voters residing in more closed economies were 
likely to sanction national leaders for past performance outcomes, but voters in open economies were 
relatively less likely to attribute reward or blame to domestic politicians for economic performance”.  
(Hellwig and Samuels, 2007: cf; see also Fernandez-Albertos, 2006; Kayser, 2007). 
 In more recent years, however, the incumbents seem to have largely lost their traditionally 
assumed advantage. Actually in a relatively high number of recent European elections (in 10 of 23 cases 
from 2008 to 2011) the incumbent prime minister didn’t even run as his or her party’s candidate for 
reelection when the party presumed that its electoral support would be hurt by the government’s bad 
performance and a new candidate could do better. Whether this has been confirmed or not is not possible 
to be tested, as it would imply comparisons with merely hypothetical occurrences. But the moves to 
launch new candidates by parties in government reveals that at least some party leaders felt that, in 
contrast to the usual assumption, the incumbent advantage has turned negative. Of course the actual 
results also depend on the relative capability of the opposition to take benefit from the government’s 
erosion. We will try to account for these effects in the following pages. 
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2. Pro or Retro Voters? 
 
In well-established traditions of electoral studies there are two basic approaches to voters’ motivations at 
the time of making their electoral choices. The “prospective” approach, as elaborated more prominently 
by Anthony Downs (Downs, 1957; Hinich and Munger, 1997), assumes issue voting by which voters 
basically ponder party policy proposals oriented towards the future. As stated by Downs, “Each citizen... 
votes for the party he believes will provide him with higher utility than any other party during the coming 
electoral period” (Downs, 1957: 38). Actually Downs did consider that the government’s party past 
performance could be used by the voters to estimate its likely future policy positions. But as the 
incumbent’s past actions can be either satisfactory or unsatisfactory or just bring about blurred 
information, he didn’t include this variable in a more general voter’s decision rule. In Downs’s view, the 
voters may believe that the issues of the future are disjoint from the settled issues of the past, so past 
performance would be irrelevant.  
In contrast, the “retrospective” theory, as initiated by V. O. Key (Key, 1966; Fiorin, 1981) 
presumes that voters are past-oriented and choose a party mainly for its previous performance in 
government. In Key’s words, “Voters may reject or approve what they have known. They are not likely to 
be attracted in great numbers by promises of the novel or unknown” (Key, 1966: 61). Basically it is 
assumed that voters either punish or reward a party for its government management. A narrower version 
of this approach, usually known as the “economic vote”, focuses on governments’ economic performance. 
As put by some of its promoters, “Good [economic] times keep parties in office, bad times cast them out” 
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). 
The two approaches, though, may be less incompatible that it seems as they may be referring to 
different components of voter’s choice. In an insightful synthesis, Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. has postulated 
that voters may use a retrospective evaluation of a party’s performance as a weight of credibility for the 
party’s promises for the future. From observed pre-election performance, voters can infer useful 
information about likely post-election performance. In Hibbs’ words, “Voters [as “principals”] settle up 
with their “agents” [parties] by evaluating performance ex-post for much the same reason –moral 
hazard— that insurance premiums are typically experience-rated”. So if a party has had a high number of 
failures in its governmental experience, it will be less credible regarding its capacity to comply in the 
future with its policy proposals and therefore it will be low graded by the voters. Hibbs postulates, thus, 
that we can assume wide “prospective voting” with a “rational retrospection” (Hibbs, 2006). 
A similar synthesis of voter’s decision rule had previously been attempted by Morris Fiorina by 
making it “more complex, more inclusive” at integrating issue voting and retrospective voting (Fiorina, 
1977). He introduced the voter’s evaluation of the incumbent’s performance as a “bias” of her voting 
decision based on policy proposals. He also made the clever point that policy convergence in a two-party 
system (as stipulated, in particular, by the median voter’s theorem) leads to expect a tied election and 
then, in Fiorina’s insight, the contenders will have “a compelling motivation to attempt to circumvent the 
limitation of campaign strategies to platform changes” (p. 607). 
Indeed elections are asymmetric between the government and the opposition. This is because it 
can be assumed that voters can have a short memory and weight the recent performance of the party in 
government more heavily than some past, perhaps remote, or just inexistent performance in government 
of the parties now in the opposition. Within this asymmetry it has traditionally been assumed that 
incumbents have an advantage, especially because they control and can select and manipulate information 
about the current state of the country and their own recent management. But as the voters’ bias at 
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retrospectively evaluating parties and candidates refers to reliability or competency, it can also be 
negative for the government if its most recent management is associated with bad performance. In 
Fiorina’s words, the better-known “incumbent… may be less preferred than an uncertain challenger” 
(Fiorina, 1977: 622). 
Actually, one can wonder why most voters would bother with voting at all if their aim were only 
to punish or reward a party performance in government without implications for future management. 
Revealingly, Key portrayed the electorate as a “rational God of vengeance or reward” (Key, 1964: 568). 
The lesser-divine intuition of the “prospective” theory is that voters are not mainly concerned with 
judging the past per se but also have a strong interest in forthcoming policy-making, expected government 
performance and their subsequent benefits and that it’s this interest that mainly drives them to the polls. 
As they cannot guess, however, to what extent a party’s current policy proposals would be transformed 
into actual policy by a hypothetical party government, they may use “retrospective” evaluations of parties 
in their choice for the future. 
 
 
3. The Economy Issue 
 
While the “economic voting” theory was almost given for dead a few years ago (see Anderson, 2007), it 
has recently returned riding on the horse of the high salience of the economic issue in virtually all 
elections in European countries in the last few years. A major critique against this approach is, of course, 
that democratic elections do not always focus on economic issues, but that other elements such as cultural 
issues (including race, religion, territory and moral issues), foreign and security crises, as well as non-
policy affairs such as corruption scandals and leadership capacities, can be decisive in many electoral 
contests.  
However, the salience of the economic crisis has been increasing in voters’ concerns, the public 
debate and the electoral campaigns at least since 2008 and has become overwhelmingly dominant in the 
most recent elections in Europe. This is not an issue that all political parties have chosen as a priority for 
their messages and campaigns. Actually many parties in government, feeling that they would be unable to 
face the housing, the bank or the debt crises efficiently, would have certainly preferred to deal with some 
other issue on which their proposals could give them advantage. Some of them even tried to evade the 
economic crisis as a major electoral issue even when it was already undeniable by standard indicators. 
Certainly, other elements are relevant to explain electoral results. Many voters keep their party loyalties in 
spite of the changing agendas due to long-term cumulative party identification. Regarding the economy 
issue, some people blame the banks or other actors rather than the government for the crisis. But there has 
been an increasing and significant number of voters that have given the economic issue high political 
prominence, in a sufficient amount to make a difference in collective behavior and aggregate electoral 
results. 
A crucial development is that in front of the current crisis the economy has ceased to be a policy 
issue on which parties can compete with clearly differentiated policy proposals and has become, at least 
for a while, a valence issue involving a big trend towards party policy convergence. It might have been 
expected that such a big crisis of financial capitalism would favor leftist parties, as people would seek 
refuge in governmental protection. But the international scope of the crisis has hurt especially those 
parties, like the Social-democrats and Labourites that have traditionally been more associated with an 
expanded role for state governments and with claims for the sovereignty of the states. In fact, virtually all 
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governments in European countries have adopted or have felt forced by the European Union to adopt 
“austerity” policies involving budget cuts, tax raises, cutoffs of public jobs and labor deals and 
regulations leading to frozen or reduced wages. This has entailed more drastic policy changes for leftist 
parties in government to move rightwards than the other way around. All government parties, however, 
have been hurt by the crisis. As put by The Economist, “A new politics has emerged in which old 
allegiances have frayed, political identities have blurred and voters’ trust in familiar parties has crumbled” 
(The Economist, April 28, 2011; see discussion by Kayser, 2009; Bartels, 2011). Whether or not party 
ideology matters for electoral performance under the current crisis conditions is to be tested below. 
If parties converge in their policy positions and the most salient issue is a valence-issue, electoral 
competition tends to be centered on party and candidate’s performance and credibility. It’s this “bias” in 
evaluating party proposals that can make a difference, break a tie in a two-party competition or give some 
party a significant advantage in multiparty elections. This requires indeed a “retrospective” look at the 
pre-election performance in order to obtain appropriate information and cues about the likely future 
performance of parties and candidates.  
This is how the “economic voting” approach is having a revival, although its fit can be just 
temporal and operational. The typical variables of the approach –economic issue and past government 
performance— should be selected as relevant elements by any reasonable analysis of the current situation 
even if it were developed from different theoretical and analytical bases. In future elections, nevertheless, 
other issues can be salient and decisive, as has occurred so many times in the past. On some of these 
issues, political parties may also be able to compete on different policy positions not implying 
convergence. Thus, alternative operationalizations of the basic “prospective with retrospection” voting 
model can eventually become more appropriate for analyzing future elections. 
 
 
4. Clarity of Irresponsibility 
 
Generally speaking, processes of transnationalization of human relations erode state governments’ 
capabilities. These processes affect not only important economic exchanges such as trade, investments 
and migrations, but also issues related to crime and security, health and environment and other facets of 
human relations. For sure governments’ performance also depends on a number of domestic factors, 
including local economic mismanagement, policy errors, corruption and failures of leadership. But voters 
can be aware of the degree of transnationalization of the economy and make state governments less 
responsible for crises and recessions than in past periods with closer economies. 
 As suggested above, two hypotheses have arisen regarding this question (see discussion in 
Kayser, 2007). For some, voters may develop a reaction in favor of the incumbent government in a 
comparable way to what is usually observed for natural disasters and other unassailable events. Also 
governments can present themselves as victims of incontrollable events. Thus what could be called 
“natural-disaster hypothesis” presumes that an international economic crisis may cast clarity of ir-
responsibility of state governments. Then, where transnational economic integration is high, like in the 
European Union, economic performance may have a smaller effect on the vote. More broadly, economic 
interdependence would reduce accountability and, thus, erode some crucial foundations of state-based 
democracy. 
 For others, however, a similar awareness of the transnational scope of the crisis and the voters’ 
capacity to clarify the irresponsibility of state governments for economic performance may produce a 
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political effect in the opposite direction, that is, to move voters’ away from supporting their incumbent 
governments. If voters feel that state governments are strongly constrained in their policy choices, in 
particular by the directives, agreements and policy decisions of the European Union, they may consider 
party policy proposals in domestic elections less credible to be transformed into actual policies. Thus we 
can identify here a possible explanatory factor of governments’ electoral defeats. It’s not only that 
increasing economic transnationalization can hurt some of the government’s previous supporters, such as 
farmers and small businessmen, or that the austerity policies provoking in the short term reductions of 
public spending and increases of unemployment may lead people previously benefitted from state 
services and jobs to punish the incumbent government. It’s also that voters involved in internationalized 
economic sectors can now ponder the higher opportunity costs of maintaining support to inefficient or 
corrupt governments that might have been seen as lesser evils in the past. A general wave of growing 
distrust of elected politicians can indeed be observed in many countries in recent periods. 
 A common characteristic of the two hypotheses just sketched is that both may imply not 
misinformation on the side of voters regarding the role of domestic governments in economic 
performance, but rather awareness of their irresponsibility. In other words, not lack of clarity of 
responsibility, but clarity of irresponsibility. Then if voters cannot target responsible decision-makers for 
the economic crisis, why should they refrain from punishing whoever they may have at hand, which are, 
first of all, the government parties submitted to electoral verdict? This behavior does not necessarily 
imply that voters are irrational because they may be targeting the wrong guilty actors. Actually it may 
rather imply that voters can be rational and even relatively well-informed regarding the role of some 
political actors in the economic crises, but just not to have the appropriate institutional mechanisms for 
directing their mistrust to more appropriate targets. It’s not only that some voters may want to “punish” 
governments for the crisis, but withdrawing support to previously voted for parties can also entail 
disbelief in their capacity to fulfill policy promises for the future, as previously suggested. Only more 
accountable European Union-wide officers and other transnational decision-makers could make the 
exchanges between voters, candidates and elected politicians more attuned to every actor’s real 
responsibilities in public management. 
 Nevertheless, state-level institutional settings can also play a role in the capacity of voters to 
identify the appropriate responsible actors for public performance (as initially pointed out by Powell and 
Whitten, 1993). Generally, democratic regimes that concentrate and personalize political power are more 
likely to permit a clear identification of responsibilities and experience turnover during a crisis. Hence we 
could expect more targeted votes in presidential regimes. But as parliamentarism is the dominant 
institutional setting in European countries, the differences should be observed, if any, between those 
countries with concentrated single-party governments and those with coalition governments in which 
power is shared and several parties can be made somewhat accountable for the government’s 
performance. We also try to test this question below. 
 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on 63 parliamentary elections in 29 member-states and official candidates 
of the European Union from January 2004 to December 2011. We seek to see whether the previously 
discussed relations among economic and political variables hold for the whole period. But we will also 
look at whether there has been an increasing relationship between them by splitting the sample of 
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observations into two periods --before and after September 2008. This is an increasingly accepted 
dividing moment in the analysis of the economic crisis as it refers to the bankruptcy of the global 
financial firm Lehman Brothers, the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, which was at the same time a high 
alarm signal to public opinion and the trigger of further actual financial crises. Specifically we work with 
35 elections before September 2008 and 28 elections afterwards and use a dummy variable 0,1 to account 
for this periodification. (See Table 1). 
 The dependent variable to be explained is the change in electoral support for parties in 
government. We operationalize this by measuring relative changes in percentages of votes between two 
successive elections, according to the formula: 
 
(%Vit - %Vit-1)x100 / %Vit-1 
where : 
%Vit : percentage of votes for party i in election at time t; 
%Vit-1: percentage of votes for party i in the previous election.  
 
 We choose relative and not absolute change in percentages of votes because the loss of, say, 10 
percentage points for a party with a previous support at 20 percent entails a great loss (50% in our 
measurement), while the same absolute difference of ten percentage points for a party with previous 
support at, say, 40 percent, is a relatively minor loss as it is keeping most of its previous voters (the loss is 
just 25% in our measurement). This measure permits us to grasp the degree of gains or losses with a 
single variable, instead of having to use both the absolute percentage of votes in the previous election and 
the absolute difference in percentages between successive elections. 
With this we can also approach indirectly the effect of some institutional differences previously 
mentioned, as a party with large support (such the 40 percent in the example) tends to form a single-party 
government or a coalition government in which it can be the dominant partner, while a party’s smaller 
size (such as the 20 percent just taken as example) tends to be associated with its participation in a 
multiparty coalition government. 
Nevertheless, in order to check these differences more explicitly we also measure separately the 
relative change in electoral support for the incumbent prime minister’s party and for the total of parties in 
the incumbent government coalition, if different. The values for these variables are presented in Figures 1 
and 2. (Data sources: cf).  
The average relative change of votes from 2004 to 2011 for the Prime minister’s party was -
11.4%, and for all the government parties it was -15.4%.      But the values for the prime minister’s party 
are notably different for the two periods just identified: -5.7% and -18.6%, respectively. Similarly, for the 
coalition government parties the values are -9.8% and -22.4%, respectively. All in all, more than half 
(51%) of elections from 2004 to 2008 led to a change of the prime minister’s party. But again the 
differences between the two periods are remarkable: 44% and 63%, respectively. There are reasons, thus, 
to sustain the hypothesis that the worsening of the economic situation in more recent years has been 
associated with the increasing frequency of electoral losses of incumbent parties and government defeats. 
As explanatory or independent variables we first choose the economic performance. We 
operationalize this in two ways (by using data from OECD and Eurostat). First, for each country we take 
the average percentage of growth of the Gross Domestic Product in the four quarters before the quarter of 
each election. This rather usual index reflects the stronger impact of recent performance on voters’ 
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information and motivation. The values are notably different for the two periods previously identified: 
4.4% for the first period and 0.7% for the second period. 
Second, for each country we take the percentage of unemployment at the time of election (as 
given by the mentioned sources for the month before). For this index the values are also worse for the 
second period although not so different as for the previous index: 7.6% for the first period and 9.6% for 
the second. 
In accordance to our previous discussion, we also select as a second explanatory variable the 
government’s party ideology in order to check whether leftist or rightist parties suffer greater losses in 
electoral support. For this we use operationalizable data of parties’ ideology on a left-right scale from 0 to 
10 based on expert surveys (source: Parlgov.org). We can use these values both along the continuum and 
in simplified classifications of parties in clusters on left, center and right positions. 
An additional variable captures whether the incumbent prime minister ran as top candidate for his 
or her party or was replaced with a new candidate. This is operationalized as values 1 for the former 
occurrence and 0 for the latter. 
Finally, we include the following additional variables of control: 
- Time in office of the incumbent prime minister’s party. With this we can capture the fact that 
longer tenures may entail higher likelihood of losing elections independently of other factors. We 
measure government duration in years. The average value is 6.1, that is, barely one and a half 
term (as legislative terms are of four or five years), which means that an incumbent government’s 
party may have only about 50% likelihood of being reelected. This also seems to confirm the 
vanishing of the traditional incumbency advantage. 
- Post-communist countries in Eastern Europe. With this we take into account the well-established 
observation that recent democracies tend to have less institutionalized party systems and 
experience higher electoral volatility. Indeed, a high proportion of elections in our sample (40%) 
have been in those countries, so the effect could be significant. We include this as a dummy 
variable 0,1. 
 
The results of the statistical analysis, as presented in Table 2, can be summarized as follows. The 
rate of economic growth is a statistically significant predictor of relative change in the electoral support 
for the incumbents, especially for the prime minister party and also for all the parties in coalition 
governments. More growth entails relatively better incumbent electoral performance; less growth or 
recession, worse electoral performance. Likewise, the negative impact of the level of unemployment is 
significant for both measures of incumbent electoral performance and higher for the prime minister’s 
party. 
We observe that the association of the variables measuring economic performance and the 
measure of relative change in electoral support for the incumbent prime minister’s party is relatively 
stronger for larger parties. This may be taken as support for the hypothesis that concentrated and 
personalized political power, as is especially the case in single, large party governments, permits a better 
identification of responsibility for government management and therefore is more likely to experience 
turnover during a crisis.  
Regarding the prime minister’s party ideology, we use both the quantitative scores on the 0-10 
left right axis and a dichotomic classification of left vs. right, as for whether it has higher or lower scores 
than 5. As shown in Figure 3, leftist governments have performed systematically worse than rightist 
governments. But when taking economic performance into account we find no evidence of a relatively 
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worse electoral performance for either left or right governments. This seems to suggest that left 
governments can be associated with periods of worse economic performances, but the political 
consequences of bad rates of economic growth and unemployment hurt both leftist and rightist 
governments in similarly proportioned degrees. Even more clearly, the trends of rise and decline in 
relative change of electoral support over time are very similar for leftist and rightist governments, as can 
be observed in the Figure. We have also tried a trichomotic classification for left, center and right parties, 
as well as for parties’ membership to Europe-wide political groups in the European Parliament (basically 
the Socialist, Liberal and People’s groups), but the low number of cases for some of the categories makes 
the results not significant. 
For the prime minister running for reelection we observe a relatively positive effect with 
statistical significance on the share of vote for his or her party. Nevertheless, as we discussed above, it’s 
not possible to disentangle the endogeneity of this variable, as government parties may tend to change 
their candidate when the economy is performing badly and they expect a bad electoral result, so tending 
to present the prime minister for reelection in relatively favorable circumstances. 
The dividing line between and after September 2008 does not turn out to produce significant 
results. Economic performance accounts for the worsening electoral performance of both the prime 
minister’s party and the government parties in both periods. This can be read as stable sensitivity of 
voters’ behavior to the degree of economic crisis. As the economic variables after September 2008 
perform worse than before in most countries, the incumbents performance also worsen, but no identifiable 
change in voters’ evaluation of government’s performance can be observed between the two periods. 
Regarding the other control variables, time in office and post-communist country, although they 
work with the expected negative signs, they turn out not to be statistically significant. This also confirms 
the significance of the association between economic performance and incumbent’s electoral 
performance, which is the main result of our analysis. 
 
 
6. Concluding Comments 
 
We have observed that state government’s parties in European Union countries are losing elections in 
high frequency during the last few years, especially since the financial and economic crisis became 
broadly visible around September 2008. The electoral performance of the government’s party appears to 
be clearly associated with the economic performance of the country just before the election, as measured 
by rates of economic growth and levels of unemployment. The relative losses of votes are somewhat 
higher for large parties, which typically form single-party governments or party-dominated coalitions, 
than for smaller parties participating in multiparty coalition governments, as the former can be made more 
easily responsible of bad performance than the latter. 
We have not found clear evidence of changes in the sensitivity of voters’ electoral behavior to 
changes in the economy. Frequent turnover of incumbent prime minister’s and government’s parties 
seems to be mostly explained by the worsening of the economic conditions in comparison with the 
immediately previous period. Although European electorates may be experiencing an increasing 
frustration of previously accumulated expectations regarding the benefits of government’s management, 
the statistical techniques so far used in this analysis does not show that voters are behaving essentially 
11 
 
differently from previous periods in which the economy could have also been the most prominent 
electoral issue.  
The higher frequency of defeats of incumbent leftist parties can also be explained by the bad 
economic conditions in which, in general, these parties have run for reelection in the last few years. But 
whether a relatively worse economic situation can be partly due to the previous management of those left 
parties in government is yet to be explored.  
These results suggest continuity with earlier experiences, particularly with the immediately 
previous period 2004-2008. Nevertheless, a new fact in the most recent period is that the increasing 
transnationalization of economic relations has further weakened the state governments’ capability to face 
economic difficulties and may have weakened the subsequent voters’ trust and support. Together with the 
tendency towards parties’ convergence in economic policy positions, which is greatly a result of the 
increasingly authoritative role of the European Union institutions over the state governments, 
transnationalization has made voters’ electoral choices in state-level elections less relevant for policy-
making.   
In the light of turmoil such as the one we are observing, some authors have speculated with a 
general propensity of voters to make their choices in reaction to irrelevant events that governments have 
nothing to do with and for which no government response would be expected, as might also be the case 
for important aspects of the economic crisis nowadays. Some have gone so far as to try to estimate the 
electoral impact of disparate events such as local college football or basketball games (Healy et al., 2010) 
or of “acts of God” such as bad harvests, shark attacks, droughts and floods or pandemics. The 
speculation amounts to presume that ignorant voters can believe in untested connections and be victims of 
demagogues, although this may not necessarily require presuming that most people are irrational (Achen 
and Bartels, 2004).  
We make a different reading of recent events related to the economic crisis and want to suggest a 
comparison with the “firing the coach” typical reaction to defeats and failures in sport matches and 
tournaments. As elaborated, for instance, in the growing discipline of economics of football, firing the 
coach is analyzed as a ritual scapegoating (Dobson and Goddard, 2011). Sport club members, like voters 
in state-level elections in our case, can be aware of the fact that a failure, such a team’s or an economy’s 
underperformance, is due to a number of factors that cannot be fairly simplified as only bad management. 
But managers and governments are punished, even if many people realize that they are not always fully 
responsible for all the team’s or the economy’s performance, precisely because voters cannot trust 
promises for the future anymore and regular democratic functioning requires making the managers and 
the rulers responsive.  
Nevertheless, as in a typical occurrence in sports regarding the team achievements when a new 
manager is appointed, the choice of a new prime minister may make no difference to economic 
performance. Actually, increasing political instability can even add a new element of distrust and trouble 
to the numerous previously existing factors for economic recession and high unemployment. In many 
elections in European countries in the last few years voters have offered the prime minister’s head in 
ritual sacrifice. But as a change of prime minister may not improve the government’s capacity for facing 
the crisis effectively, further disappointments may still increase the frequency of governments’ turnover 
and the degree of political instability. Further studies will have to account for the attuning of this 
prediction.  
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Table 1. Sample of Elections 
1. Austria, 2006, 2008 
2. Belgium, 2007, 2010 
3. Bulgaria, 2005, 2009 
4. Croatia, 2007, 2011 
5. Cyprus, 2006,  2011 
6. Czech Republic, 2006, 2010 
7. Denmark, 2005, 2007, 2011 
8. Estonia, 2007,  2011 
9. Finland, 2007,  2011 
10. France, 2007 
11. Germany, 2005, 2009 
12. Greece, 2004, 2007, 2009  
13. Hungary, 2006,  2010  
14. Iceland, 2007, 2009 
15. Ireland, 2007, 2011 
16. Italy, 2006, 2008 
17. Latvia, 2006, 2010, 2011 
18. Lithuania, 2004, 2008  
19. Luxembourg, 2004, 2009 
20. Malta, 2008 
21. Netherlands, 2006, 2010 
22. Poland, 2005, 2007, 2011,  
23. Portugal, 2005, 2009, 2011 
24. Romania, 2004, 2008  
25. Slovakia, 2006, 2010, 2012 
26. Slovenia, 2004, 2008  
27. Spain, 2004, 2008, 2011 
28. Sweden, 2006, 2010  
29. United Kingdom, 2005, 2010  
 
Note: This includes 27 member-states at the moment of writing plus Croatia and Iceland, but excluding 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia for lack of economic data and Turkey for not being ranked as a free 
electoral democracy by international agencies. 
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Table 2. Regressions of Relative Change in Incumbents’ Electoral Performance 
 
A. On GDP growth and unemployment rate 
 
 
B. On Left-Right prime minister’s party ideology 
 
C. Interaction between prime minister’s party ideology and economic performance 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                               
        _cons    -2.560573   9.469241    -0.27   0.789    -21.98985     16.8687
        Unemp    -1.966633   .7318872    -2.69   0.012    -3.468342   -.4649249
Q1Q4Growthper     3.035896   1.065242     2.85   0.008     .8502005    5.221592
      Postcom    -9.110207   6.828886    -1.33   0.193    -23.12192    4.901509
   Timeoffice     .2984511   .7211542     0.41   0.682    -1.181235    1.778137
                                                                               
  PMrelchange        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 28 clusters in Countrycode)
                                                       Root MSE      =  22.515
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2817
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0010
                                                       F(  4,    27) =    6.37
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      59
                                                                               
        _cons    -1.601853    10.2379    -0.16   0.877    -22.60829    19.40459
         Left    -2.653244   6.537651    -0.41   0.688     -16.0674    10.76091
        Unemp    -1.931514   .7225532    -2.67   0.013     -3.41407   -.4489568
Q1Q4Growthper     2.980731   1.049109     2.84   0.008     .8281364    5.133325
      Postcom    -8.836925   6.721455    -1.31   0.200    -22.62821    4.954361
   Timeoffice     .2842087   .7043845     0.40   0.690    -1.161069    1.729486
                                                                               
  PMrelchange        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 28 clusters in Countrycode)
                                                       Root MSE      =  22.686
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2843
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0011
                                                       F(  5,    27) =    5.62
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      59
                                                                               
        _cons      1.50704   11.45976     0.13   0.896    -22.00645    25.02053
     LeftGrow     .5798705   1.655941     0.35   0.729    -2.817841    3.977582
    LeftUnemp      .535873    1.50741     0.36   0.725    -2.557077    3.628823
         Left    -8.903858   15.28292    -0.58   0.565    -40.26182    22.45411
        Unemp    -2.225756   .9638116    -2.31   0.029    -4.203334   -.2481782
Q1Q4Growthper     2.755195   1.454285     1.89   0.069    -.2287508    5.739141
      Postcom    -8.140664    7.11969    -1.14   0.263    -22.74906    6.467734
   Timeoffice     .2439683   .7050238     0.35   0.732    -1.202621    1.690558
                                                                               
  PMrelchange        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 28 clusters in Countrycode)
                                                       Root MSE      =  23.084
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2870
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0008
                                                       F(  7,    27) =    5.13
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      59
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D. On Prime minister running for reelection 
 
 
E. On post-September 2008 period 
 
 
 
  
                                                                               
        _cons    -21.95198   13.71935    -1.60   0.121    -50.10176    6.197805
        PMrun     17.70309   8.652894     2.05   0.051    -.0511805    35.45736
        Unemp    -1.174125   .8386557    -1.40   0.173    -2.894904    .5466544
Q1Q4Growthper     2.829931   .9866376     2.87   0.008      .805518    4.854344
      Postcom    -11.94922   6.672219    -1.79   0.085    -25.63948    1.741046
   Timeoffice     .2773001   .6532401     0.42   0.675    -1.063038    1.617638
                                                                               
  PMrelchange        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 28 clusters in Countrycode)
                                                       Root MSE      =  21.794
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3395
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0001
                                                       F(  5,    27) =    7.65
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      59
                                                                               
        _cons     5.468792   10.31384     0.53   0.600    -15.69346    26.63105
    AftLehman    -.5042898   5.358023    -0.09   0.926    -11.49804    10.48947
       Center    -22.42989   8.015022    -2.80   0.009    -38.87536   -5.984426
       Left04    -10.26617   7.181138    -1.43   0.164    -25.00065     4.46831
        Unemp    -1.796775   .6987373    -2.57   0.016    -3.230466   -.3630847
Q1Q4Growthper     3.250473   1.109223     2.93   0.007     .9745355     5.52641
      Postcom    -14.02262   5.871818    -2.39   0.024    -26.07059   -1.974643
   Timeoffice     .3799969   .4603605     0.83   0.416    -.5645848    1.324579
                                                                               
  PMrelchange        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 28 clusters in Countrycode)
                                                       Root MSE      =  21.212
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3979
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0021
                                                       F(  7,    27) =    4.46
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      59
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Figure 1. Relative Change in Electoral Support for Prime Minister’s Party 
 
  
16 
 
Figure 2. Relative Change in Electoral Support for Government Parties 
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Figure 3. Left-Right Prime Minister’s Party Ideology and Electoral Performance 
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Figure 4. Left-Right Government’s Ideology and Electoral Performance 
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